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Dear Editor 
 
Thank you for your letter of 21 January and your encouragement to submit a revision.   We are 
pleased to note that the reviewers are very supportive of the paper; we are grateful for their 
suggestions and believe that the changes we have made have significantly improved the paper. 
Our responses to their comments are shown in italics  below: 
 
Reviewer: 1 
Thank you very much for your positive comments.  
 
Additional Questions:  
Implications. What I lack in the paper is a better discussion on the potential empirical ways in which 
the model presented could be tested. It should not be too hard to derive clear testable hypotheses.  
For instance, if the bias is as on page 8 suggested, related to a revision of the hurdle rate due to prior 
experience of incorrect decisions (an underestimation of risk or cash flows), decision makers in firms 
where such risks have been realized should be using higher hurdle rates. The hurdle rates might thus 
be related to past success/failure. Also behavioral variables such as prior experience and age might 
influence the decision making. I encourage the authors to include a discussion around testable 
implications of their model. 
I like their conclusion on a better follow up of the investments made, both those projects chosen and 
some major rejected, in order to better communicate information on hurdle rates used vs actual 
outcomes, in order to reduce potential cognitive biases.  
 
We have followed your suggestion and added a discussion on testable hypotheses in the final section.  
 
 
 
Reviewer: 2 
I like very much the idea of using behavioural finance ideas to explain the hurdle rate premium 
puzzle. As noted above I think there is a major gap in the argument presented. Also, as noted, I think 
the gap cannot easily be fixed since the assumption used appears to be false. However, I believe the 
author is onto something valuable with the idea of using the retrievability bias as part of an 
explanation for the HRP puzzle. I think a stronger more water-tight argument supporting a weaker 
claim along the lines of the paper could be publishable.   
Thank you for your valuable feedback particularly about our insufficient assumption. We have taken 
your comment very seriously and have made changes to strengthen the argument in the paper.  In 
addition please see our more detailed responses below. 
  
Additional Questions:  
The main weakness in the argument is that the paper assumes that when a project is reviewed, it can 
be determined, from the success or failure of the project whether a hurdle rate that is too high or 
too low has been used. No details of the review process are discussed. It is not explained how the 
success or failure of completed or partially completed projects is measured, or how this 
measurement process can lead to the conclusion that the hurdle rate used was too high, appropriate 
for the project risk, or too low.  
 
The assumption in any case appears to be false. "Risk", "correct hurdle rate", etc. are all theoretical 
concepts, not observables. They are probabilistic concepts, and can be estimated only by using 
samples, not by taking a single observation. Many factors determine the success or failure of a 
project, so that a particular project fails does not directly lead to the conclusion that a too low hurdle 
rate was used when accepting the project.  
  
Thank you for pointing this out. We accept that the point on ‘determining’ the ‘true’ HR ex-post was 
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weak. We agree that one cannot know 'ex post' in a mechanical way whether a hurdle rate that was 
applied in an appraisal was too low. In S2.3 we now explain our assumption that within organizations 
there are generally widely accepted perceptions about whether or not individual past investment 
decisions were good decisions, satisfactory decisions or bad decisions. Where an investment is 
perceived to be regrettable then there will be informal/unconscious individual and group thinking 
about what was incorrect in the appraisal process.  (Note: we are not saying that all completed or 
partially completed projects will have their success/failure formally measured - though sometimes 
this will happen)  
 
We hope that the revised draft, with its substantial changes to Sections 2.3 and 2.4 addresses your 
concerns. One notable addition is that the paper now identifies two categories as to why a project 
may fail and how this may be recognized. Although the risk and correct hurdle rate are not 
observable, we believe that the perceptions of decision-makers and/or formal processes allow some 
understanding of what the principal error in the appraisal had been. We argue that, whatever the 
understanding, there will be a recognition that, the proposal would have been less likely to have been 
given the ‘go ahead’ if the hurdle rate had been higher. These perceptions are unlikely to be solely 
focused on cash flows since even a cash flow projection error reinforces an awareness of risk, and the 
discount rate is likely to be implicated. 
 
Where there is a formal process, ‘ failure of a project’ may mean a loss in company value measured 
by a negative NPV. A decision-maker may seek to identify what type of risk had been recognized and 
what type had not been anticipated. However, even if there is no formal process, the perception of 
the project being a mistake will serve as feedback to the decision-maker. Thus, this measurement is 
not a necessary requirement for our explanation.  
 
We agree that “many factors determine the success or failure of a project” and now take care not to 
claim that a too low hurdle rate at the time of the appraisal may be the only reason for a project to 
fail. Our new material in S2.3 argues inductively; but we hope it shows that failure in general or 
failure due to false risk appraisal (not necessarily the hurdle rate alone making the project fail) can 
make a project appear riskier than it actually was, which may in turn lead to an overcompensation.  
 
We also agree with your point about probabilities and that one draw from a distribution (one 
project’s outcome) does not tell about the risk of a project.  However, from a behavioural rather than 
statistical perspective, we now more explicitly argue that the decision-makers may not view it as just 
one draw but as information on the “actual risk of the project”; and may draw incorrect conclusions 
(such as ‘the risk was higher than I thought’) which may affect future appraisals as stated before. 
Thus, a decision-maker would be biased by the single salient observation of the outcome of a project 
and subjectively revise their perception of risk. 
------------------------ 
 
There are some, more minor criticisms. I won't go through these in detail, since if the major gap in 
the retrievability argument can be fixed, any minor problems can easily be tweaked away too. 
However, I did feel that the author dismissed a bit too readily some of the existing institutional 
arguments for the HRP puzzle. For example, that top managers deliberately overstated the hurdle 
rate to compensate for over-optimism in project proposers. 
 
Yes, we may not have given adequate recognition of the existing institutional explanations of the 
HRPP. We do not deny the existence or validity of these arguments, and in S1.3 now more explicitly 
state our limited contention that the discussion of the HRPP also deserves acknowledgement of 
unconscious adjustments and explanations which have not been sufficiently addressed. Moreover, in 
Section 2.3 we pick up arguments that justify a higher hurdle rate (e.g. over-optimistic cash flows) in 
our new discussion on potentially unrecognized risks. Further studies will have to clarify how the 
different arguments function together or which ones may be stronger or weaker.  
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Retrievability Bias in Explaining the Hurdle Rate Premium Puzzle 
 
 
 
1 Investment appraisal and setting the hurdle rate 
Making correct investment decisions poses an important challenge for senior management. In 
particular, capital investments and consequently the appraisal of potential projects 
significantly affect a company’s long-term performance and survival. The optimal decision, 
i.e. choosing the most profitable investment project, requires a non-distorted decision process 
with accurate data and rational decision-making. This paper revisits the phenomenon that “a 
hurdle rate in excess of the corporate cost of capital is often used to appraise divisional project 
proposals” (Harris, 2000, p. 91), and aims to provide a novel explanation based on managerial 
cognitive behaviour and corporate post-audit feedback processes. 
Götze et al. (2015) model the ideal investment decision process and identify seven typical 
stages, of which Stages 5 and 7 of Figure 1 are particularly relevant to this study. Stage 5 
refers to the investment appraisal methods applied and the acceptance decision made; Stage 7 
refers to the monitoring and ‘post audit’ of projects and the resulting feedback and learning 
process. The setting of hurdle rate and the potential systematic error, as argued later in this 
paper, affect both stages. 
 
  Figure 1 An investment decision process model based on Götze et al. (2015). 
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As regards Stage 5 of the process, discounted cash flow appraisal methods such as Net 
Present Value (NPV) and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) methods are widely recommended 
and used (see for example Haka, 2007; Meier and Tarhan, 2007; Pike, 1996). They require the 
following parameters: the discount rate and the project's forecast cash flow profile. The 
decisions about the parameters will affect the projected profitability of the considered 
investment projects and thereby the outcomes of the investment appraisal. This paper 
particularly focuses on the discount rate and what has become known as the Hurdle Rate 
Premium Puzzle.  
The NPV and IRR methods are related. The former seeks to identify the 'value' that would 
be created, i.e. the present (discounted) value of all current and future cash flows. A project 
should be adopted if the NPV is positive, i.e. the project's rate of return exceeds the discount 
rate applied. Hence, the discount rate represents a minimum rate of return or hurdle rate. The 
IRR method calculates the rate that would lead to an NPV of zero, i.e. the rate of return of the 
investment project. A project should be supported if its IRR exceeds an appropriate hurdle 
rate. For both NPV and IRR methods the cost of capital typically serves as the hurdle rate. In 
our analysis, we will concentrate on the NPV method and assume a typical stream of cash 
flows; that is, where initial outflows are followed by (mainly) inflows, so that the higher the 
discount rate, the lower the estimated NPV.  
The values of the parameters utilised in investment appraisal derive from information in 
accounting records and knowledge and, in practice, from the decision-maker’s memory and 
wider experience that can influence subjective parameter estimates (Luft and Shields, 2010). 
When making judgements the human cognitive system – exhibiting limited rationality – often 
uses decision rules that simplify a complex task and may incorporate cognitive biases, which 
will lead to suboptimal capital investment decisions. This paper examines one decision rule 
and reveals how its application under certain conditions can lead to suboptimal decision-
making.  
To detect a distortion in setting the hurdle rate, the rate actually chosen by the corporate 
decision-maker can be compared with an estimate of the optimal hurdle rate, i.e. an 
objectively appropriate one. Therefore, in Sections 1.1 and 1.2 we will discuss the 
determination of the hurdle rate in theory and in practice and consider the Hurdle Rate 
Premium Puzzle as practical phenomenon. Section 2 introduces the ‘availability’ decision rule 
and argues how this rule of thumb can lead to distorted judgement in the context of setting the 
hurdle rate. An illustrative example shows how a so-called heuristic might guide a corporate 
decision-maker’s judgement and the bias that can result. The retrievability bias can 
systematically lead decision makerdecision-makers to apply a discount rate higher than the 
cost of capital, and thus partially explains the boundedly rational hurdle rate premium. 
1.1 Determination of the optimal hurdle rate 
Discount rates play a major role in most investment appraisal methods. They are of crucial 
importance in enabling comparability of cash flows occurring at different points in time and 
permit comparisons between investment alternatives. They are applied to balance out 
differences in tied-up capital and in economic lives and reflect how much the future cash 
flows will be devalued. 
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The cost of capital approach is considered suitable for determining an appropriate discount 
rate. It is the minimum average rate of return needed to satisfy the requirements of the 
providers of funds and should recognise the effect of the project on the overall level of risk to 
the company’s funders. It can be determined by the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) 
with the cost of debt derived from debt financing agreements, and the risk-adjusted company 
or project-specific cost of equity
1
 based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Using 
WACC as hurdle rate appears rational. Assuming that the projects being considered have the 
same risk as the company’s current projects on average, there is no better indicator of the 
company’s future risk than the current cost of capital which reflects the expectations of 
creditors and shareholders given the current level of information.  
It can be argued that companies utilizing the CAPM should conduct project-specific risk 
assessments and hence adjust the company WACC upwards or downwards to find the most 
appropriate hurdle rate – a key understanding of corporate finance theory since Modigliani 
and Miller (1958). The resulting tailored discount rates follow the logic that different projects 
or company divisions are associated with different levels of risk and therefore require 
adjustment.2 However, a company’s overall risk is the result of the individual capital 
investment projects’ risks, and thus a company’s WACC always represent the average 
project- (or division-)
3
 specific hurdle rates.  
In summary, the determination of a company-wide cost of capital – potentially adjusted for 
a project’s specific risk – is a well-established, objective and accurate approach to 
approximate the optimal cost of capital (see for example Modigliani and Miller, 1958; 
Modigliani and Miller, 1965; Elton, 1970; Myers and Turnbull, 1977).  
1.2 Determination of the hurdle rate in practice 
Empirical research confirms that companies apply company-wide as well as project-specific 
discount rates – the majority applying a single company-wide discount rate only (see for 
example Meier and Tarhan, 2007; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Brounen et al., 2004; Bruner et 
al., 1998). In doing so, they typically use WACC.  
Of particular relevance to this paper, the self-reported discount rate – and therefore the hurdle 
rate – often considerably exceeds the computed cost of capital (Brunzell et al., 2013; Meier 
and Tarhan, 2007; Poterba and Summers, 1995; Gup and Norwood, 1982). Those studies 
contrast optimal and actual, i.e. self-reported, hurdle rates. Optimal rates were approximated 
by externally calculating WACC with data derived from the market and financial statements. 
This paradox that the self-reported hurdle rate exceeds the optimal one is known as the Hurdle 
Rate Premium puzzle. Evidence for this paradox is provided in studies of US companies by 
                                                
1 It builds on ‘classical’ research, for example originated by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), followed by publications of Black (1972), 
Black et al. (1972), Rubinstein (1973), Fama and MacBeth (1973), Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1973), Ross (1976), and Ross (1977) 
and has been further developed for example by Dolde et al. (2012). It has seen serious criticism and justifications, for example by 
Jagannathan and Meier (2002), Wood and Leitch (2004) or Fama and French (2004). 
2 However, in practice there are problems in objectively determining an appropriate project-specific hurdle rate (see, for example, 
Titman and Martin, 2010). Moreover, conducting project-specific risk adjustments is questioned by corporate finance literature. For example, 
Reimann (1990) suggests establishing a regularly updated cost of capital based on CAPM principle, applied as a common hurdle rate. Risk 
adjustments should be made at the cash flow level. Risk adjustments can be made in various ways. This is not picked up in this paper; for 
empirical findings about different approaches applied see for example Lindblom et al. (2010). 
3 In the following, company WACC will be contrasted to project-specific cost of capital, but the same logic  applies for divisional cost of 
capital. 
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Meier and Tarhan (2007) and Poterba and Summers (1995) and in Nordic companies by 
Brunzell et al. (2013).  
A higher than optimal hurdle rate reduces profitability and implies a bias against lower-risk 
projects relative to riskier projects (Titman and Martin, 2010). It can also lead to a short-
termism; companies may systematically favour projects with relatively high cash inflows in 
the close future by more strongly discounting cash flows that occur at a later point in time 
(Dobbs, 2009). 
1.3 Existing explanations for the Hurdle Rate Premium 
The Hurdle Rate Premium (HRP) has been known for many years and various explanations 
have been put forward. 
Brunzell et al. (2013) empirically find that the sophistication of a company’s investment 
appraisal method is inversely related to the hurdle rate premium (the more sophisticated the 
method, the lower the hurdle rate). Additionally, they find that short-term pressure felt by 
decision-makers has a positive impact on the hurdle rate (Brunzell et al., 2013). Meier and 
Tarhan (2007) suggest that the growth potential and financial situation of a company are 
positively associated with the hurdle rate premium. However, these are merely statistical 
observations, and do not provide logical explanations for the paradox. 
Titman and Martin (2010) note the potential scenario of capital rationing with mutually 
exclusive projects in which the hurdle rate might be raised to equal the opportunity cost, i.e. 
the rate of return of the next-best project, but this interesting concept does not provide a 
generic explanation for the HRP.  
A relatively high hurdle rate might also be chosen to compensate for managerial 
overconfidence and overoptimism, which typically lead to inflated cash flow projections (see 
for example Gervais, 2010; Dobbs, 2009). This explanation could be valid where different 
level managers are involved in generating proposals from those making the investment 
decisions, since the higher level might want to adjust for biased behaviour below. However, 
instead of increasing the hurdle rate to correct for overconfidence and overoptimism, it would 
be more straightforward for the decision-maker to reduce the projected cash inflows across 
the project term; this would also avoid unintended compounding of the correction beyond the 
planning horizon.  
Studies finding a hurdle rate premium (Meier and Tarhan, 2007; Poterba and Summers, 
1995; Brunzell et al., 2013) compare the (theoretically required) cost of capital to the hurdle 
rate self-reported by companies. There is, however, Yet there is no evidenceno argument in 
the HRP literature that the reason for the premium is only attributable to a conscious 
(upwards) adjustment of the cost of capital to derive a hurdle rate – the premium maymay also 
appears to be applied without much thought or awareness.  
The adjustment of hurdle rates due to the explanations above mostly require conscious 
adjustment, and they may do not fully solve the puzzle. In the following section we argue that 
the premium may arise due to unconscious intuitive judgements and cognitive biases; that is, 
it may be caused by decision-makers using simplified decision rules, so-called heuristics, to 
facilitate decision-making (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, Kahneman, 2003, Dobbs, 2009). 
This would imply, though none of the approaches outlined above has extensively dealt with 
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this aspect, that distorted judgement may be an explanation. The hurdle rate premium could, 
at least partly, be attributed to limited (bounded) rational behaviour in that cognitive 
reasoning systematically and unconsciously guides decision-makers to make suboptimal 
decisions. 
2 The relevance of cognitive biases to explain the Hurdle Rate Premium  
Despite normative views that the optimal hurdle rate for appraising projects should equal the 
cost of capital, empirical surveys of practice do not confirm this. The arguments outlined in 
1.3 above may provide partial explanations for the HRP but we maintain it has another 
explanation, based on decision-makers’ bounded rationality and biased intuitive judgements.   
Intuition may be involved whenever judgements are incorporated in the decision process 
thereby influencing the decision: When a manager determines the discount rate or hurdle rate 
for evaluating an investment project, he or she may subjectively use different sources of 
information including his or her
4
 own experience, thereby deviating from the ‘optimal’ 
process. The optimal process or outcome may be disputed but the tendency to set hurdle rates 
higher than can be explained by standard corporate finance theory, has been shown.  
As indicated above, a decision-maker’s memory, knowledge and experience almost always 
play a role in the process of searching and selecting the information from accounting records 
and knowledge (Luft and Shields, 2010). This may vary between a fairly objective, ‘close to 
optimal’ choice of the hurdle rate where only few or no pieces of information are subjectively 
searched and selected on the one hand, and a highly subjective choice of the hurdle rate on the 
other hand. Even the ‘close to optimal’ case implies some subjective considerations. 
2.1 The heuristics and biases concept − some background 
From psychology-based research it is known that in decision situations under uncertainty, 
decision-makers often use ‘heuristics’ or ‘heuristic principles’ when their complex task is to 
make a judgement (and eventually make a decision) where a probability or value has to be 
estimated or predicted (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Heuristics are often described as 
decision shortcuts, rules of thumb or simple decision rules. Generally, a decision-maker – 
deliberately or (more typically) unconsciously5 – simplifies the problem (i.e. uses simpler 
judgemental operations) in order to solve it. This can be due to various reasons such as 
limited information, time constraints and bounded cognitive capacity to store, retrieve and 
process information. As a consequence, the decision-maker forfeits an optimal result, which 
otherwise – if at all – might only be reached by a thorough and rational analysis, and accepts a 
satisfying and sufficing non-optimal decision instead. This bounded-rational behaviour is 
known as ‘satisficing’ (Simon, 1955). 
To arrive at a judgement about an event that the decision-maker has limited information 
about, and that is not available to perception, the heuristic serves to search and choose the 
informational sources and information to utilise (Hastie and Dawes, 2010). Brunswik’s Lens 
Model provides a framework for judgement (Brunswik, 1952; Cooksey, 2001). The hurdle 
                                                
4 For simplicity, in future, the male pronoun is used but this is not intended to imply any significance. 
5 For a discussion on the extent to which heuristics are deliberate or unconscous processes, see for example Sloman (2002). 
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rate is the to-be-judged criterion for which a judgement, i.e. an estimate, has to be made. The 
decision-maker uses the cues (the ‘lens’ that connects the environment with internal 
psychological processes) that are available to him or her such as information in accounting 
records, knowledge about how hurdle rates should be set and also from memory and wider 
experience (Luft and Shields, 2010). Cues may be unconscious, interrelated and 
interdependent and involve ‘limited ecological validity’ due to uncertainty in the environment 
and limited time (Brunswik, 1952; Hastie and Dawes, 2010). The decision-maker then 
processes the cues’ information and makes an inference as to what the criterion should be, i.e. 
he makes an estimate of the criterion (the hurdle rate) and thus arrives at a judgement (Hastie 
and Dawes, 2010). Heuristics can be described as the way cues are combined and processed.  
Generally, heuristics can be very helpful tools; intuitive thinking is not wrong in general 
but deemed to be skilled and successful (Kahneman, 2003). Heuristics save time and simplify 
a problem and may lead to generally good judgements (Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009), 
unless – consciously or unconsciously – a cognitive bias occurs, that can result in severe and 
systematic decision distortions. Setting the hurdle rate might be such a complex decision task. 
The following example will illustrate where subjective judgement represented by a heuristic is 
involved in setting the hurdle rate. It will be shown how a heuristic might influence a 
manager’s judgement and the bias that can result. 
2.2 Example 
Consider a situation where a decision-maker such as a manager or a CFO of a large6 
company, who is responsible for making capital investment decisions, has data about previous 
investment projects and their outcomes, as well as about the cash flow projections of a 
potential investment project. The manager is well-educated in corporate finance, experienced 
in his job and has decided upon, and can recall, a number of investment projects of similar 
nature (e.g. with respect to the project’s features and investment frequency). The company 
routinely applies a project-specific discount rate based on company WACC adjusted for 
project-specific risk. 
Imagine the manager’s task is to determine the discount rate and thus the NPV to appraise 
a potential investment opportunity. Being experienced in his job, he is not inclined to conduct 
an explicit detailed analysis of the project’s risk; instead, he usually intuitively considers all 
risks associated and prefers a prompt decision. “With today’s dynamic business environment, 
executives must have cost-effective and user-friendly analysis techniques that they can apply 
easily but not mechanically, which are embedded in their everyday thought processes.” 
(Harris, 2000, p.103). As stated the manager has decided upon several projects of similar 
nature in the past and ex post considered whether parameters such as the cash flows and the 
level of risk had been correctly estimated.the deviations between the parameters such as the 
cash flows planned versus actual and the anticipated risks to the actual outcomeshurdle rates 
chosen ex ante versus the actual cost of capital of these projects. 
Let us assume that the project-specific risk premium applied for all similar projects in the 
past has been the same due to a similar level of riskiness. Also that the decisions to invest 
                                                
6 Decision-makers in large companies might have a more significant level of experience due to high investment volume, a high number 
of projects and standardised processes. Moreover, there can be more than one manager deciding on projects (e.g. each one responsible for 
another field) so that the “knowledge pool“ and feedback to investments might be greater and better. 
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tur ed out to be reasonable ex post since the cost of capital applied as hurdle rate for these 
projects appeared to be a good approximation – except for one project: One of the comparable 
projects, on which the manager participated in the investment decision, failed and led to a loss 
in company value. The (relatively unlikely or not anticipated) worst case ‘state of nature’ 
happened and the cash flows failed to materialise as expected. Thus, as regards the project’s 
risk assessment, the hurdle rate chosen for the initial appraisal still seemed 
appropriateobjectively justifiable. An ‘outlier’ risk outcome of low probability (such as a 
plant burning down) may have occurred but was not present in the decision-maker’s mind; the 
event had never occurred and its probability was underestimated. From thea subjective point 
of view of the manager, this scenario can lead to a different risk assessment ex post and biased 
judgement in a similar future situation as will be explained in the next section. 
2.3 The retrievability bias and its surprising effect 
The ‘availability heuristic’ is a simple decision rule that may be applied by the manager in 
such a situation. It implies that, when a decision is to be made about the probability of an 
event, an individual ‘searches’ the memory and concludes that those events which come to 
mind more easily appear to be more frequent and therefore probable (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974; Kahneman, 2003). 
Assuming that the managerial decision-maker is not inclined to conduct an explicit 
thorough analysis but feels able to evaluate the risks informally in his mind, he may 
unwittingly employ the availability heuristic in making a judgement about the appropriate 
hurdle rate. He must judge which hurdle rate (i.e. higher, lower, or equal to the WACC and by 
what amount) appears to be the correct adequate one given uncertainty about the future and 
thus which one ensures a good decision about the project’s value. In practice, board decision-
making plays an important role. However, boards consist of individuals each having been 
involved in good or bad prior decisions so the process described, though incomplete, remains 
valid. 
In this process, the availability heuristic suggests the following reasoning for an unbiased 
mind: The decision-maker recalls all projects of similar nature from the past and assesses the 
extent to which the appraisals –  including the assessments of risk withand the applied hurdle 
rate – wereas appropriate. “Decision makers use their own experience, and evaluate new 
opportunities by comparing them with a reference point from personal knowledge.” 
(Emmanuel et al., 2010, p. 481). He might conclude that for projects, except one, his 
judgement of the risks and his resulting decision, i.e. the selected hurdle rate, was appropriate; 
and thus this hurdle rate seems ceteris paribus to be a good starting point for a rate to be 
applied to the current project. However, some minor amendment of the hurdle rate might 
seem necessary due to his experience with the incorrect decision that was made 
(underestimation of the risk of fire) because he underestimated risk (e.g. the risk of fire) and 
thus the hurdle rate applied by the company was seemed too low. For appraising future 
similar projects the hurdle rate should be slightly revised upwards correcting for the neglected 
type of risk.  
One bias that can occur due to the availability heuristic is the so-called ‘bias due to the 
retrievability of instances’ developed by Tversky and Kahneman (1974): When some events 
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are more vivid than others or have occurred recently, they can more easily be recalled from 
memory and thus appear more frequent and therefore probable than others. Other events 
might have occurred equally frequently in the past but, as they are less vivid in the decision-
maker’s memory or occurred a longer time ago, they appear less likely (see Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974; Bazerman and Moore, 2013). This bias will occur if the manager’s decision 
is overly influenced by the very salient exceptional project (such as a production site fire). 
That event can make him believe that his assessment of the project’s risk and thus his 
determination of the project’s hurdle rate was may have been incorrectinappropriate; it led the 
company to experience a loss in value, and should have been set significantly higher.  
We assume that organisations generally have widely accepted perceptions about whether 
or not individual past investment decisions were good decisions, satisfactory decisions or bad 
decisions. Given the assumption that an investment is perceived to be regrettable and to have 
‘failed’, there will be formal and informal, or even unconscious, individual and group 
thinking about what was the reason for the failure or what had been incorrect in the appraisal 
process.  
There are two broad causes for the failure of an investment project: cash flows that turn out 
to be worse than forecast, and a risk assessment that may result in inappropriately low risk-
adjusted cost of capital, i.e. actual risk-adjusted costs of capital that exceed expectations. As 
regards the risk assessment of a project as the cause of failure, the following two categories 
have been identified: 
Category I: The appraisal process was correct and all the risks were adequately recognised 
(including the level of uncertainty about cash flows), but the actual ‘state of nature’ turned out 
to be bad. Enterprises will inevitably have projects that go wrong despite correct 
quantification of risk, and they need to accept some failures; if they set the hurdle rate so high 
that no projects ever failed, this would also screen out many good projects. 
Category II: In the appraisal process, risk was not adequately recognised with regard to:  
 The cash flows were over-optimistic given the facts that were known at the time; thus 
there was a greater organisational information risk (related to the reliability of the 
forecasting) than recognised.  
 The project had inherent flaws that were not known at the time of the appraisal; thus 
the project information risk was not adequately recognised.  
 The costs of capital were underestimated at the time (procedural risk), or they 
increased more than was anticipated (information risk). 
 The operating (internal) environment deteriorated more than was anticipated (e.g. key 
staff left, the factory was flooded); thus the operating risks were not adequately 
recognised. 
 The external environment changed more than was anticipated; thus the business risk 
was not adequately recognised.  
In all of the above Category II issues, the hurdle rate applied is likely to be seen to have been 
inappropriate. For example, not recognising over-optimistic cash flows or not recognising 
potential changes in the market (external environment) represents an underestimation of risk. 
The firm’s policy and the decision-maker’s motivation may now increase efforts that all 
Category II reasons will be eliminated in a subsequent appraisal to improve decision-making. 
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Learning from, and adjusting to the inappropriate appraisal components will be central to a 
project review; and a flawed investment appraisal that led to project failure represents a 
salient event to the decision-maker.  
To a different decision-maker it may not be obvious whether the project failure was a ‘poor 
draw’ from the correctly specified distribution (Category I) of the project’s outcomes, or 
whether there was a cash flow error or a risk was inadequately recognised (Category II). 
Conceivably, a decision-maker may realise that risk had been adequately recognised 
(Category I) and thus it was not their mistake and should not influence their future judgement. 
Despite this reservation, there may still be a high enough proportion of projects that are 
perceived to be in Category II for the retrievability bias to irrationally upwardly skew hurdle 
rates:  
The bias arises if now, due to the ‘painful’ experience of a project failure in general or of a 
false appraisal, the perceived risk and thus hurdle rates for the subsequent projects under 
consideration are set higher than appropriate and what the ‘availability’ rule of thumb 
suggests. In other words, prior mistakes are overcompensated. The systematic setting of 
inappropriately high hurdle rates gives distorted estimates of projects’ profitability and leads 
to underinvestment. The feedback to the decision-maker due to false project appraisal will be 
discussed in the next section. 
 
2.4 Systematisation of scenarios, outcomes and feedback  
Figure 2 systematises and graphically depicts the problem by identifying eight cases, their 
decision outcomes and interpretations by the decision-maker. In Cases A, B, F and H decision 
mistakes were not made because even with the appropriate hurdle rate, the decision (accept or 
reject project) would have been the same. Cases D and E refer torepresent appropriate risk 
assessments and the correct settings of the hurdle rate and are therefore not considered further. 
In Case A, the decision-maker has – depending on his or herbased upon their risk 
assessment – set the hurdle rate too high but the project nevertheless is accepted and will not 
lead to a loss in company value, i.e. with hindsight, it will been seen to be ‘good’. This 
implies that the projected cash flows must have been sufficiently high to compensate the 
inappropriately high hurdle rate effect. Error does not result from the hurdle rate being set too 
high in this case. The same logic applies to Case F which was correctly accepted, due to 
strong positive cash flows, despite an underestimation of risk and an inappropriately low 
hurdle rate. 
With regard to the feedback provided to the decision-maker we should now consider the 
investment decision-making process and its final step (see Stage 7 in Figure 1): the follow-up 
monitoring phase of a project and in particular of the cash flows and the discount raterisk 
assessment (target-actual comparison and resulting analyses) followed by feedback and 
learning. This stage is illustrated in the right column in Figure 2. If a regular routine 
mechanism is established which ex post explicitly analyses projects that have been accepted 
(the hurdle ratei.e. the cash flows and whether the risks were adequately considered and thus 
the reasons why a project may not have turned out as projected), then decision-makers will 
get feedback on projects that have been accepted, such as Cases A, D, F and G. The analysis 
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will then reveal that the cash flows had been estimated too high, too low or appropriately and 
what risks were considered adequately or not and why (cf. Category II).  
hurdle rate had been set too high, too low or appropriately. In doing so, the a false setting 
appraisal of the hurdle rate in Cases A and F will become evident (green feedback fields). 
This information perception about a non-appropriate risk assessment and as one consequence 
thereof, a potentially non-appropriate hurdle rate does not necessarily appear as a significant 
mistake to the decision-maker, since the decision would not have been altered using a 
different the correct hurdle rate. However, tThe decision- maker is unlikely to perceive the 
non-appropriate risk assessment and hurdle rate as significant because the decision would not 
have been altered using the ‘correct’ rate. 
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Figure 2 Decision-maker's feedback perception ofto the setting of the hurdle rate (HR). 
When evaluating a similar project next time, this analysis with its insights on the 
(falseinappropriate) risk assessment and thus) setting of the hurdle rate (should and) probably 
will be taken into account by the decision-maker. The bottom arrow of Figure 2 represents 
learning about one’s ability and updating one’s prior idea about the appropriate risk and 
hurdle rate when new information arrives (see Gervais, 2010). New information comes 
particularly from post audit feedback on projects that get adopted (A, D, F and G); this will 
affect the decision-maker’s subsequent estimates of the most appropriate hurdle rates. We 
note that the feedback that managers get can be of low quality as it is imprecise and slow, and 
investment decisions are made infrequently and irregularly, which complicates learning 
(Gervais, 2010). Knight (1921) cautions that “in business management no two instances, 
perhaps, are ever very closely alike, in any objective, describable sense.” However, we can 
assume that experienced decision-makers have capacity to integrate new information and 
compare it to previous situations so that learning does happen. A formal or an informal post 
audit of projects may provide information about the mistakes in the appraisal; realising that 
the initial risk assessment was insufficient may happen consciously but, more importantly, 
also unconsciously. 
Comment [author1]: Please note that this is 
now a revised Figure 2: 
 
5th column: 
“Assessment of Decision” --> “Decision was” 
“No error” --> “correct” 
“Error” --> “incorrect” 
 
Last column: 
“Feedback” --> “Perception” 
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As indicated above, tThe essential point is that the feedback on some investment decisions, 
such as G, which ‘go wrong’ might be more salient and vivid than on others such as A and F 
which turn out as successes; this is elaborated in the following paragraphs. 
With regard to Case B (H): The project’s risk is not adequately recognised and may be 
underestimated (overestimated); thus the hurdle rate is set too high (low) and the project is 
rejected due to a negative NPV, but the erroneous rate is not obvious; the decision-maker will 
not be aware of the false setting of the rate, because companies seldom organise follow-up 
monitoring on projects that have been rejected; insight gained is typically outweighed by the 
additional cost of such an analysis. The decision-maker is thus not in a position to use this 
information when assessing the next project. Furthermore, even if ex post reviews were 
carried out on B and H, they would show that despite the incorrect inappropriate hurdle rates 
the appraisal outcomes were, in fact, the right ones. 
Our model contains two scenarios for incorrect accept-reject decisions: First, a false 
positive case can be illustrated by the fire example in Section 2.2, is represented by. It may 
correspond to Case G in Figure 2 and reveals a Type 1 error in that it incorrectly rejected the 
hypothesis (H0: The project under consideration is rejected). The project was not rejected but 
with an appropriate rate it would have been rejected. The hurdle rate was set too low, which 
resulted in insufficient discounting of future cash (in)flows. This can result in accepting a 
project which is later seen to generate a negative NPV. As Tthe poor decision 
enforcedevidenced by a poor outcome is likely to be a salient event (red feedback field in 
Figure 2) and, it can generate the previously described retrievability bias due to retrievability 
as described before and an incorrectly raised hurdle rate for appraising a comparable project 
next timein future appraisals.  
Secondly, a false negative case is given in Case C of Figure 2. In this so-called Type 2 
error, the process fails to reject the null hypothesis becauseT the project risk may bise 
overestimated, the  hurdle rate is therefore set too high, and and the project is rejected due to a 
negative estimated NPV. With an appropriate (lower) hurdle rate, the appraisal would have 
correctly shown a positive NPV for the proposed project and the project might have turned 
out to be successful ex post. However, the decision-maker will not realise the false decision 
because the project will not be undertaken. The decision-maker is unlikely to get feedback on 
the mistaken risk assessment and having set the hurdle rate too high and so does not learn 
from the experience. This case illustrates the long-term consequences of setting the hurdle 
rate too high; projects are falsely rejected resulting in underinvestment. Moreover, and as 
indicated above, risky projects are systematically preferred to low-risk projects (Titman and 
Martin, 2010) and a short-term bias is induced (Dobbs, 2009).  
Figure 2 summarises the different combinations of ‘too high/too low’ and ‘accept/reject 
project’ and shows the cases in which feedback is provided to the decision-maker on the 
investment project and on their project appraisal that may influence the setting of the hurdle 
rate. As indicated above, perception and cognitive processes, reinforced by the one-sidedness 
of the post-audit process in concentrating only on adopted proposals, will impact the decision-
maker’s judgement and subjective reasoning when evaluating future projects. As Case G is a 
much more salient event, the false risk assessment and thus inappropriate setting of the hurdle 
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rate (too low) will influence the judgement more severely than Cases A (too high, but project 
succeeded nevertheless) and F (too low, but project succeeded nevertheless).  
Furthermore, we can assume that projects which proved to be successful are subjected to 
investigations less frequently and thoroughly than those, which fail. I.e. cash flows and 
discount rates might not always be evaluated in a detailed and comprehensive way for 
positive NPV pr jects ex post. If so, then Cases A and (F) will result in even less feedback to 
the appraisal including the risk assessment hurdle rate being set too high (low) than will Case 
G and the argument is strengthened further.  
Our analysis to this point has referred to the determination of absolute profitability of an 
investment project. However, relative profitability, i.e. the comparison of different (mutually 
exclusive) projects will reveal the same systematisation of cases and errors as derived from 
the original example. Due to a suboptimal setting of the hurdle rate (too low or too high), the 
project which appears relatively profitable is not necessarily the objectively more profitable 
one.  
 
2.5 Discussion 
The two extremes of ex post feedback – on the one hand, no (or lax) follow-up in the case of 
non-adopted or successful proposals and, on the other, a thorough follow-up mechanism on 
bad investments – give different levels of information to the decision-maker. A rigorous 
follow-up monitoring of all proposals could uncover the false setting of hurdle rates. 
However, these procedures might still not overcome the disproportionate effect that an 
accepted project’s failure due to a false erroneous formal or informal risk perception leading 
to an inappropriate setting of the hurdle rate (as obvious in the Type 1 error Case G) has on 
the decision-maker’s intuition and the retrievability bias may persist. Failure of the project in 
general, and the failure of a project due to a false appraisal as regards the setting of the hurdle 
rate, as, e.g.ins the risk of Case G, remains the most influential events and will be more 
available in memory for the next project decision when events like these are retrieved. It will 
serve as a strong cue to influence cognitive reasoning and thereby the judgement. 
Because of humans’ retrievability bias, the event ‘hurdle rate has been set too low’ – 
additionally associated with a negative affect – stays in memory more easily. The event 
‘(possible) failure’ is likely to come to mind more easily and thus a higher hurdle rate appears 
to be more suitable, and is therefore more ‘probable’, than the truly appropriate one. To the 
decision-maker, it seems it might help to avoid a decision mistake and wrong acceptance of a 
project, and will thus influence judgement. In other words if, next time, information on which 
hurdle rate to set is retrieved from memory, a Type 1 error, the setting of an underestimation 
of risk (and thus a too low rate) leading to an error, will be the cue that is intuitively more 
promising. Hence, the decision-maker will tend to revise the previous hurdle rate upwards but 
would not systematically set a hurdle rate too low; this explanation is in accordance with 
empirical findings relating to the hurdle rate premium.  
Strategies do exist for correcting cognitive biases, i.e. debiasing, include motivational, 
cognitive and technological strategies or decision aids (see for example Larrick, 2004). 
Moreover, awareness of potential biases and the situations where they can occur is the most 
important requirement for correcting biases (see for example Kahneman, 2003; Milkman et 
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al., 2009). However, this debiasing process can be long and requires constant review and 
vigilance in the decision process, particularly the more complex the context, and is up to the 
individual decision-maker (Bazerman and Moore, 2013). Thus, even though an individual is 
aware of a cognitive bias, efforts are needed to correct it. A well-structured investment 
appraisal process with a post audit stage can serve as a good starting point for developing 
decision aids pr viding awareness. However, the biases inherent in the setting of the hurdle 
rate may not be easily corrected and are therefore still be observable in practice.  
 
3. Conclusion and Outlook 
Our analysis requires empirical testing to validate the relevance of the retrievability bias in the 
setting of the hurdle rate. Experiments could address the effect of past experience of failed 
investment projects, and of the review process, on future risk assessments and thus the hurdle 
rate decisions. A first testable hypothesis may be:  
H1: The more failures of investment projects a decision-maker has experienced, the 
higher the risk premium incorporated into the hurdle rates applied in future project 
appraisals. 
The failure of an investment project could result from either false investment appraisal or 
from one of the anticipated states of nature (independent of the appraisal).  The awareness of a 
false appraisal assumes that some kind of review or post audit of the project has been 
performed – either formally or informally/unconsciously. Thus, we could consider the effect 
of a formal versus a subjective informal review of the failed investment appraisal:  
H2a: The more incorrect assessments of investment projects’ risks (disclosed in a 
formal post-audit process) a decision-maker has made, the higher the risk premium 
incorporated into the hurdle rates applied in future project appraisals. 
H2b: The more incorrect assessments of investment projects’ risks a decision-maker 
has perceived, the higher the risk premium incorporated into the hurdle rates applied 
in future project appraisals. 
Further potential avenues to explore in this context, but which we will not lay out as formal 
hypotheses include: There may be a relationship between the level of detail of a company’s 
review process and its impact on hurdle rate premia. More sophisticated review processes will 
disclose more details and thus more mistakes in the appraisal, which in turn could affect the 
decision-maker’s risk and hurdle rate assessment. Secondly, given that the more investment 
appraisals an individual has been involved in, i.e. the higher a decision-maker’s work 
experience in this field, the more failed investment projects s/he may have experienced. Thus 
one might investigate associations between HRPs and demographic variables such as age, 
years of work experience, or personality traits such as confidence of attitudes to risk.  
To conclude, the determination of parameters in investment appraisal, particularly 
estimating a project’s risk and thus setting the hurdle rate, necessarily involves a certain 
degree of subjectivity. From this it follows that heuristics, which to some extent rely on 
intuition, may guide a decision-maker’s judgement, and cognitive biases can systematically 
distort decisions. This paper shows the effect of the retrievability bias on the judgement of 
experienced managerial decision-makers. It provides a reasoned explanation of how managers 
deciding on investment projects may be biased in tending to systematically set hurdle rates 
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higher than suggested by theory. While we are not claiming to provide a complete explanation 
of the paradox, we believe that cognitive biases and the noise in feedback on adopted 
investment proposals play a systematic part in explaining why hurdle rates are set above the 
rationally advocated discount rate, and we thus help solve the Hurdle Rate Premium Puzzle. 
The policy implications of this study are that corporate success could be enhanced, firstly, by 
making executives aware of the premium phenomenon and of its behavioural causes; and, 
secondly, by widening the scope of the post-audit programme to include significant rejected 
investment proposals, and communicating the opportunity cost of ‘false negative’ decisions 
on proposals not adopted.  
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Retrievability Bias in Explaining the Hurdle Rate Premium Puzzle 
 
 
 
1 Investment appraisal and setting the hurdle rate 
Making correct investment decisions poses an important challenge for senior management. In 
particular, capital investments and consequently the appraisal of potential projects 
significantly affect a company’s long-term performance and survival. The optimal decision, 
i.e. choosing the most profitable investment project, requires a non-distorted decision process 
with accurate data and rational decision-making. This paper revisits the phenomenon that “a 
hurdle rate in excess of the corporate cost of capital is often used to appraise divisional project 
proposals” (Harris, 2000, p. 91), and aims to provide a novel explanation based on managerial 
cognitive behaviour and corporate post-audit feedback processes. 
Götze et al. (2015) model the ideal investment decision process and identify seven typical 
stages, of which Stages 5 and 7 of Figure 1 are particularly relevant to this study. Stage 5 
refers to the investment appraisal methods applied and the acceptance decision made; Stage 7 
refers to the monitoring and ‘post audit’ of projects and the resulting feedback and learning 
process. The setting of hurdle rate and the potential systematic error, as argued later in this 
paper, affect both stages. 
 
  Figure 1 An investment decision process model based on Götze et al. (2015). 
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As regards Stage 5 of the process, discounted cash flow appraisal methods such as Net 
Present Value (NPV) and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) methods are widely recommended 
and used (see for example Haka, 2007; Meier and Tarhan, 2007; Pike, 1996). They require the 
following parameters: the discount rate and the project's forecast cash flow profile. The 
decisions about the parameters will affect the projected profitability of the considered 
investment projects and thereby the outcomes of the investment appraisal. This paper 
particularly focuses on the discount rate and what has become known as the Hurdle Rate 
Premium Puzzle.  
The NPV and IRR methods are related. The former seeks to identify the 'value' that would 
be created, i.e. the present (discounted) value of all current and future cash flows. A project 
should be adopted if the NPV is positive, i.e. the project's rate of return exceeds the discount 
rate applied. Hence, the discount rate represents a minimum rate of return or hurdle rate. The 
IRR method calculates the rate that would lead to an NPV of zero, i.e. the rate of return of the 
investment project. A project should be supported if its IRR exceeds an appropriate hurdle 
rate. For both NPV and IRR methods the cost of capital typically serves as the hurdle rate. In 
our analysis, we will concentrate on the NPV method and assume a typical stream of cash 
flows; that is, where initial outflows are followed by (mainly) inflows, so that the higher the 
discount rate, the lower the estimated NPV.  
The values of the parameters utilised in investment appraisal derive from information in 
accounting records and knowledge and, in practice, from the decision-maker’s memory and 
wider experience that can influence subjective parameter estimates (Luft and Shields, 2010). 
When making judgements the human cognitive system – exhibiting limited rationality – often 
uses decision rules that simplify a complex task and may incorporate cognitive biases, which 
will lead to suboptimal capital investment decisions. This paper examines one decision rule 
and reveals how its application under certain conditions can lead to suboptimal decision-
making.  
To detect a distortion in setting the hurdle rate, the rate actually chosen by the corporate 
decision-maker can be compared with an estimate of the optimal hurdle rate, i.e. an 
objectively appropriate one. Therefore, in Sections 1.1 and 1.2 we will discuss the 
determination of the hurdle rate in theory and in practice and consider the Hurdle Rate 
Premium Puzzle as practical phenomenon. Section 2 introduces the ‘availability’ decision rule 
and argues how this rule of thumb can lead to distorted judgement in the context of setting the 
hurdle rate. An illustrative example shows how a so-called heuristic might guide a corporate 
decision-maker’s judgement and the bias that can result. The retrievability bias can 
systematically lead decision-makers to apply a discount rate higher than the cost of capital, 
and thus partially explains the boundedly rational hurdle rate premium. 
1.1 Determination of the optimal hurdle rate 
Discount rates play a major role in most investment appraisal methods. They are of crucial 
importance in enabling comparability of cash flows occurring at different points in time and 
permit comparisons between investment alternatives. They are applied to balance out 
differences in tied-up capital and in economic lives and reflect how much the future cash 
flows will be devalued. 
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The cost of capital approach is considered suitable for determining an appropriate discount 
rate. It is the minimum average rate of return needed to satisfy the requirements of the 
providers of funds and should recognise the effect of the project on the overall level of risk to 
the company’s funders. It can be determined by the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) 
with the cost of debt derived from debt financing agreements, and the risk-adjusted company 
or project-specific cost of equity1 based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Using 
WACC as hurdle rate appears rational. Assuming that the projects being considered have the 
same risk as the company’s current projects on average, there is no better indicator of the 
company’s future risk than the current cost of capital which reflects the expectations of 
creditors and shareholders given the current level of information.  
It can be argued that companies utilizing the CAPM should conduct project-specific risk 
assessments and hence adjust the company WACC upwards or downwards to find the most 
appropriate hurdle rate – a key understanding of corporate finance theory since Modigliani 
and Miller (1958). The resulting tailored discount rates follow the logic that different projects 
or company divisions are associated with different levels of risk and therefore require 
adjustment.2 However, a company’s overall risk is the result of the individual capital 
investment projects’ risks, and thus a company’s WACC always represent the average 
project- (or division-)3 specific hurdle rates.  
In summary, the determination of a company-wide cost of capital – potentially adjusted for 
a project’s specific risk – is a well-established, objective and accurate approach to 
approximate the optimal cost of capital (see for example Modigliani and Miller, 1958; 
Modigliani and Miller, 1965; Elton, 1970; Myers and Turnbull, 1977).  
1.2 Determination of the hurdle rate in practice 
Empirical research confirms that companies apply company-wide as well as project-specific 
discount rates – the majority applying a single company-wide discount rate only (see for 
example Meier and Tarhan, 2007; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Brounen et al., 2004; Bruner et 
al., 1998). In doing so, they typically use WACC.  
Of particular relevance to this paper, the self-reported discount rate – and therefore the hurdle 
rate – often considerably exceeds the computed cost of capital (Brunzell et al., 2013; Meier 
and Tarhan, 2007; Poterba and Summers, 1995; Gup and Norwood, 1982). Those studies 
contrast optimal and actual, i.e. self-reported, hurdle rates. Optimal rates were approximated 
by externally calculating WACC with data derived from the market and financial statements. 
This paradox that the self-reported hurdle rate exceeds the optimal one is known as the Hurdle 
Rate Premium puzzle. Evidence for this paradox is provided in studies of US companies by 
                                                
1 It builds on ‘classical’ research, for example originated by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), followed by publications of Black (1972), 
Black et al. (1972), Rubinstein (1973), Fama and MacBeth (1973), Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1973), Ross (1976), and Ross (1977) 
and has been further developed for example by Dolde et al. (2012). It has seen serious criticism and justifications, for example by 
Jagannathan and Meier (2002), Wood and Leitch (2004) or Fama and French (2004). 
2 However, in practice there are problems in objectively determining an appropriate project-specific hurdle rate (see, for example, 
Titman and Martin, 2010). Moreover, conducting project-specific risk adjustments is questioned by corporate finance literature. For example, 
Reimann (1990) suggests establishing a regularly updated cost of capital based on CAPM principle, applied as a common hurdle rate. Risk 
adjustments should be made at the cash flow level. Risk adjustments can be made in various ways. This is not picked up in this paper; for 
empirical findings about different approaches applied see for example Lindblom et al. (2010). 
3 In the following, company WACC will be contrasted to project-specific cost of capital, but the same logic  applies for divisional cost of 
capital. 
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Meier and Tarhan (2007) and Poterba and Summers (1995) and in Nordic companies by 
Brunzell et al. (2013).  
A higher than optimal hurdle rate reduces profitability and implies a bias against lower-risk 
projects relative to riskier projects (Titman and Martin, 2010). It can also lead to a short-
termism; companies may systematically favour projects with relatively high cash inflows in 
the close future by more strongly discounting cash flows that occur at a later point in time 
(Dobbs, 2009). 
1.3 Existing explanations for the Hurdle Rate Premium 
The Hurdle Rate Premium (HRP) has been known for many years and various explanations 
have been put forward. 
Brunzell et al. (2013) empirically find that the sophistication of a company’s investment 
appraisal method is inversely related to the hurdle rate premium (the more sophisticated the 
method, the lower the hurdle rate). Additionally, they find that short-term pressure felt by 
decision-makers has a positive impact on the hurdle rate (Brunzell et al., 2013). Meier and 
Tarhan (2007) suggest that the growth potential and financial situation of a company are 
positively associated with the hurdle rate premium. However, these are merely statistical 
observations, and do not provide logical explanations for the paradox. 
Titman and Martin (2010) note the potential scenario of capital rationing with mutually 
exclusive projects in which the hurdle rate might be raised to equal the opportunity cost, i.e. 
the rate of return of the next-best project, but this interesting concept does not provide a 
generic explanation for the HRP.  
A relatively high hurdle rate might also be chosen to compensate for managerial 
overconfidence and overoptimism, which typically lead to inflated cash flow projections (see 
for example Gervais, 2010; Dobbs, 2009). This explanation could be valid where different 
level managers are involved in generating proposals from those making the investment 
decisions, since the higher level might want to adjust for biased behaviour below. However, 
instead of increasing the hurdle rate to correct for overconfidence and overoptimism, it would 
be more straightforward for the decision-maker to reduce the projected cash inflows across 
the project term; this would also avoid unintended compounding of the correction beyond the 
planning horizon.  
Studies finding a hurdle rate premium (Meier and Tarhan, 2007; Poterba and Summers, 
1995; Brunzell et al., 2013) compare the (theoretically required) cost of capital to the hurdle 
rate self-reported by companies. There is, however, no argument in the HRP literature that the 
premium is only attributable to a conscious (upwards) adjustment of the cost of capital to 
derive a hurdle rate – the premium may also be applied without much thought or awareness.  
The adjustment of hurdle rates due to the explanations above mostly require conscious 
adjustment, they may not fully solve the puzzle. In the following section we argue that the 
premium may arise due to unconscious intuitive judgements and cognitive biases; that is, it 
may be caused by decision-makers using simplified decision rules, so-called heuristics, to 
facilitate decision-making (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, Kahneman, 2003, Dobbs, 2009). 
This would imply, though none of the approaches outlined above has extensively dealt with 
this aspect, that distorted judgement may be an explanation. The hurdle rate premium could, 
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at least partly, be attributed to limited (bounded) rational behaviour in that cognitive 
reasoning systematically and unconsciously guides decision-makers to make suboptimal 
decisions. 
2 The relevance of cognitive biases to explain the Hurdle Rate Premium  
Despite normative views that the optimal hurdle rate for appraising projects should equal the 
cost of capital, empirical surveys of practice do not confirm this. The arguments outlined in 
1.3 above may provide partial explanations for the HRP but we maintain it has another 
explanation, based on decision-makers’ bounded rationality and biased intuitive judgements.   
Intuition may be involved whenever judgements are incorporated in the decision process 
thereby influencing the decision: When a manager determines the discount rate or hurdle rate 
for evaluating an investment project, he or she may subjectively use different sources of 
information including his or her4 own experience, thereby deviating from the ‘optimal’ 
process. The optimal process or outcome may be disputed but the tendency to set hurdle rates 
higher than can be explained by standard corporate finance theory, has been shown.  
As indicated above, a decision-maker’s memory, knowledge and experience almost always 
play a role in the process of searching and selecting the information from accounting records 
and knowledge (Luft and Shields, 2010). This may vary between a fairly objective, ‘close to 
optimal’ choice of the hurdle rate where only few or no pieces of information are subjectively 
searched and selected on the one hand, and a highly subjective choice of the hurdle rate on the 
other hand. Even the ‘close to optimal’ case implies some subjective considerations. 
2.1 The heuristics and biases concept − some background 
From psychology-based research it is known that in decision situations under uncertainty, 
decision-makers often use ‘heuristics’ or ‘heuristic principles’ when their complex task is to 
make a judgement (and eventually make a decision) where a probability or value has to be 
estimated or predicted (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Heuristics are often described as 
decision shortcuts, rules of thumb or simple decision rules. Generally, a decision-maker – 
deliberately or (more typically) unconsciously5 – simplifies the problem (i.e. uses simpler 
judgemental operations) in order to solve it. This can be due to various reasons such as 
limited information, time constraints and bounded cognitive capacity to store, retrieve and 
process information. As a consequence, the decision-maker forfeits an optimal result, which 
otherwise – if at all – might only be reached by a thorough and rational analysis, and accepts a 
satisfying and sufficing non-optimal decision instead. This bounded-rational behaviour is 
known as ‘satisficing’ (Simon, 1955). 
To arrive at a judgement about an event that the decision-maker has limited information 
about, and that is not available to perception, the heuristic serves to search and choose the 
informational sources and information to utilise (Hastie and Dawes, 2010). Brunswik’s Lens 
Model provides a framework for judgement (Brunswik, 1952; Cooksey, 2001). The hurdle 
rate is the to-be-judged criterion for which a judgement, i.e. an estimate, has to be made. The 
                                                
4 For simplicity, in future, the male pronoun is used but this is not intended to imply any significance. 
5 For a discussion on the extent to which heuristics are deliberate or unconscous processes, see for example Sloman (2002). 
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decision-maker uses the cues (the ‘lens’ that connects the environment with internal 
psychological processes) that are available to him or her such as information in accounting 
records, knowledge about how hurdle rates should be set and also from memory and wider 
experience (Luft and Shields, 2010). Cues may be unconscious, interrelated and 
interdependent and involve ‘limited ecological validity’ due to uncertainty in the environment 
and limited time (Brunswik, 1952; Hastie and Dawes, 2010). The decision-maker then 
processes the cues’ information and makes an inference as to what the criterion should be, i.e. 
he makes an estimate of the criterion (the hurdle rate) and thus arrives at a judgement (Hastie 
and Dawes, 2010). Heuristics can be described as the way cues are combined and processed.  
Generally, heuristics can be very helpful tools; intuitive thinking is not wrong in general 
but deemed to be skilled and successful (Kahneman, 2003). Heuristics save time and simplify 
a problem and may lead to generally good judgements (Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009), 
unless – consciously or unconsciously – a cognitive bias occurs, that can result in severe and 
systematic decision distortions. Setting the hurdle rate might be such a complex decision task. 
The following example will illustrate where subjective judgement represented by a heuristic is 
involved in setting the hurdle rate. It will be shown how a heuristic might influence a 
manager’s judgement and the b as that can result. 
2.2 Example 
Consider a situation where a decision-maker such as a manager or a CFO of a large6 
company, who is responsible for making capital investment decisions, has data about previous 
investment projects and their outcomes, as well as about the cash flow projections of a 
potential investment project. The manager is well-educated in corporate finance, experienced 
in his job and has decided upon, and can recall, a number of investment projects of similar 
nature (e.g. with respect to the project’s features and investment frequency). The company 
routinely applies a project-specific discount rate based on company WACC adjusted for 
project-specific risk. 
Imagine the manager’s task is to determine the discount rate and thus the NPV to appraise 
a potential investment opportunity. Being experienced in his job, he is not inclined to conduct 
an explicit detailed analysis of the project’s risk; instead, he usually intuitively considers all 
risks associated and prefers a prompt decision. “With today’s dynamic business environment, 
executives must have cost-effective and user-friendly analysis techniques that they can apply 
easily but not mechanically, which are embedded in their everyday thought processes.” 
(Harris, 2000, p.103). As stated the manager has decided upon several projects of similar 
nature in the past and ex post considered whether parameters such as the cash flows and the 
level of risk had been correctly estimated. 
Let us assume that the project-specific risk premium applied for all similar projects in the 
past has been the same due to a similar level of riskiness. Also that the decisions to invest 
turned out to be reasonable ex post since the cost of capital applied as hurdle rate for these 
projects appeared to be a good approximation – except for one project: One of the comparable 
projects, on which the manager participated in the investment decision, failed and led to a loss 
                                                
6 Decision-makers in large companies might have a more significant level of experience due to high investment volume, a high number 
of projects and standardised processes. Moreover, there can be more than one manager deciding on projects (e.g. each one responsible for 
another field) so that the “knowledge pool“ and feedback to investments might be greater and better. 
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in company value. The (relatively unlikely or not anticipated) worst case ‘state of nature’ 
happened and the cash flows failed to materialise as expected. Thus, as regards the project’s 
risk assessment, the hurdle rate chosen for the initial appraisal still seemed objectively 
justifiable. An ‘outlier’ outcome of low probability (such as a plant burning down) may have 
occurred but was not present in the decision-maker’s mind; the event had never occurred and 
its probability was underestimated. From the subjective point of view of the manager, this 
scenario can lead to a different risk assessment ex post and biased judgement in a similar 
future situation as will be explained in the next section. 
2.3 The retrievability bias and its surprising effect 
The ‘availability heuristic’ is a simple decision rule that may be applied by the manager in 
such a situation. It implies that, when a decision is to be made about the probability of an 
event, an individual ‘searches’ the memory and concludes that those events which come to 
mind more easily appear to be more frequent and therefore probable (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974; Kahneman, 2003). 
Assuming that the managerial decision-maker is not inclined to conduct an explicit 
thorough analysis but feels able to evaluate the risks informally in his mind, he may 
unwittingly employ the availability heuristic in making a judgement about the appropriate 
hurdle rate. He must judge which hurdle rate (i.e. higher, lower, or equal to the WACC and by 
what amount) appears to be the adequate one given uncertainty about the future and thus 
which one ensures a good decision about the project’s value. In practice, board decision-
making plays an important role. However, boards consist of individuals each having been 
involved in good or bad prior decisions so the process described, though incomplete, remains 
valid. 
In this process, the availability heuristic suggests the following reasoning for an unbiased 
mind: The decision-maker recalls all projects of similar nature from the past and assesses the 
extent to which the appraisals – including the assessments of risk and the applied hurdle rate – 
were appropriate. “Decision makers use their own experience, and evaluate new opportunities 
by comparing them with a reference point from personal knowledge.” (Emmanuel et al., 
2010, p. 481). He might conclude that for projects, except one, his judgement of the risks and 
his resulting decision, i.e. the selected hurdle rate, was appropriate; and thus this hurdle rate 
seems ceteris paribus to be a good starting point for a rate to be applied to the current project. 
However, some minor amendment of the hurdle rate might seem necessary due to his 
experience with the incorrect decision that was made because he underestimated risk (e.g. the 
risk of fire) and thus the hurdle rate applied by the company seemed too low. For appraising 
future similar projects the hurdle rate should be slightly revised upwards correcting for the 
neglected type of risk.  
One bias that can occur due to the availability heuristic is the so-called ‘bias due to the 
retrievability of instances’ developed by Tversky and Kahneman (1974): When some events 
are more vivid than others or have occurred recently, they can more easily be recalled from 
memory and thus appear more frequent and therefore probable than others. Other events 
might have occurred equally frequently in the past but, as they are less vivid in the decision-
maker’s memory or occurred a longer time ago, they appear less likely (see Tversky and 
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Kahneman, 1974; Bazerman and Moore, 2013). This bias will occur if the manager’s decision 
is overly influenced by the very salient exceptional project (such as a production site fire). 
That event can make him believe that his assessment of the project’s risk and thus his 
determination of the project’s hurdle rate may have been inappropriate; it led the company to 
experience a loss in value, and should have been set significantly higher.  
We assume that organisations do generally have widely accepted perceptions about 
whether or not individual past investment decisions were good decisions, satisfactory 
decisions or bad decisions. Given the assumption that an investment is perceived to be 
regrettable and to have ‘failed’, there will be formal and informal, or even unconscious, 
individual and group thinking about what was the reason for the failure or what had been 
incorrect in the appraisal process.  
There are two broad causes for the failure of an investment project: cash flows that turn out 
to be worse than forecast, and a risk assessment that may result in inappropriately low risk-
adjusted cost of capital, i.e. actual risk-adjusted costs of capital that exceed expectations. As 
regards the risk assessment of a project as the cause of failure, the following two categories 
have been identified: 
Category I: The appraisal process was correct and all the risks were adequately recognised 
(including the level of uncertainty about cash flows), but the actual ‘state of nature’ turned out 
to be bad. Enterprises will inevitably have projects that go wrong despite correct 
quantification of risk, and they need to accept some failures; if they set the hurdle rate so high 
that no projects ever failed, this would also screen out many good projects. 
Category II: In the appraisal process, risk was not adequately recognised with regard to:  
§ The cash flows were over-optimistic given the facts that were known at the time; thus 
there was a greater organisational information risk (related to the reliability of the 
forecasting) than recognised.  
§ The project had inherent flaws that were not known at the time of the appraisal; thus 
the project information risk was not adequately recognised.  
§ The costs of capital were underestimated at the time (procedural risk), or they 
increased more than was anticipated (information risk). 
§ The operating (internal) environment deteriorated more than was anticipated (e.g. key 
staff left, the factory was flooded); thus the operating risks were not adequately 
recognised. 
§ The external environment changed more than was anticipated; thus the business risk 
was not adequately recognised.  
In all of the above Category II issues, the hurdle rate applied is likely to be seen to have been 
inappropriate. For example, not recognising over-optimistic cash flows or not recognising 
potential changes in the market (external environment) represents an underestimation of risk. 
The firm’s policy and the decision-maker’s motivation may now increase efforts that all 
Category II reasons will be eliminated in a subsequent appraisal to improve decision-making. 
Learning from, and adjusting to the inappropriate appraisal components will be central to a 
project review; and a flawed investment appraisal that led to project failure represents a 
salient event to the decision-maker.  
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To a different decision-maker it may not be obvious whether the project failure was a ‘poor 
draw’ from the correctly specified distribution (Category I) of the project’s outcomes, or 
whether there was a cash flow error or a risk was inadequately recognised (Category II). 
Conceivably, a decision-maker may realise that risk had been adequately recognised 
(Category I) and thus it was not their mistake and should not influence their future judgement. 
Despite this reservation, there may still be a high enough proportion of projects that are 
perceived to be in Category II for the retrievability bias to irrationally upwardly skew hurdle 
rates:  
The bias arises if, due to the ‘painful’ experience of a project failure in general or of a false 
appraisal, the perceived risk and thus hurdle rates for the subsequent projects under 
consideration are set higher than appropriate and what the ‘availability’ rule of thumb 
suggests. In other words, prior mistakes are overcompensated. The systematic setting of 
inappropriately high hurdle rates gives distorted estimates of projects’ profitability and leads 
to underinvestment. The feedback to the decision-maker due to false project appraisal will be 
discussed in the next section. 
 
2.4 Systematisation of scenarios, outcomes and feedback  
Figure 2 systematises and graphically depicts the problem by identifying eight cases, their 
decision outcomes and interpretations by the decision-maker. In Cases A, B, F and H decision 
mistakes were not made because even with the appropriate hurdle rate, the decision (accept or 
reject project) would have been the same. Cases D and E represent appropriate risk 
assessments and settings of the hurdle rate and are therefore not considered further. 
In Case A, the decision-maker has – based upon their risk assessment – set the hurdle rate 
too high but the project nevertheless is accepted and will not lead to a loss in company value, 
i.e. with hindsight, it will be seen to be ‘good’. This implies that the projected cash flows 
must have been sufficiently high to compensate the inappropriately high hurdle rate effect. 
Error does not result from the hurdle rate being set too high in this case. The same logic 
applies to Case F which was correctly accepted, due to strong positive cash flows, despite an 
underestimation of risk and an inappropriately low hurdle rate. 
With regard to the feedback provided to the decision-maker we should now consider the 
investment decision-making process and its final step (see Stage 7 in Figure 1): the follow-up 
monitoring phase of a project and in particular of the cash flows and the risk assessment 
(target-actual comparison and resulting analyses) followed by feedback and learning. This 
stage is illustrated in the right column in Figure 2. If a routine mechanism is established 
which ex post explicitly analyses projects that have been accepted (i.e. the cash flows and 
whether the risks were adequately considered and thus the reasons why a project may not 
have turned out as projected) then decision-makers will get feedback on projects that have 
been accepted, such as Cases A, D, F and G. The analysis will reveal that the cash flows had 
been estimated too high, too low or appropriately and what risks were considered adequately 
or not and why (cf. Category II). In doing so, a false appraisal of the hurdle rate in Cases A 
and F will become evident (green feedback fields). However, the decision-maker is unlikely 
to perceive the non-appropriate risk assessment and hurdle rate as significant because the 
decision would not have been altered using the ‘correct’ rate. 
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Figure 2 Decision-maker's perception of the setting of the hurdle rate (HR). 
When evaluating a similar project next time, this analysis with its insights on the 
(inappropriate) risk assessment and thus setting of the hurdle rate (should and) probably will 
be taken into account by the decision-maker. The bottom arrow of Figure 2 represents 
learning about one’s ability and updating one’s prior idea about the appropriate risk and 
hurdle rate when new information arrives (see Gervais, 2010). New information comes 
particularly from post audit feedback on projects that get adopted (A, D, F and G); this will 
affect the decision-maker’s subsequent estimates of the most appropriate hurdle rates. We 
note that the feedback that managers get can be of low quality as it is imprecise and slow, and 
investment decisions are made infrequently and irregularly, which complicates learning 
(Gervais, 2010). Knight (1921) cautions that “in business management no two instances, 
perhaps, are ever very closely alike, in any objective, describable sense.” However, we can 
assume that experienced decision-makers have capacity to integrate new information and 
compare it to previous situations so that learning does happen. A formal or an informal post 
audit of projects may provide information about the mistakes in the appraisal; realising that 
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the initial risk assessment was insufficient may happen consciously but, more importantly, 
also unconsciously. 
As indicated above, the essential point is that the feedback on some investment decisions, 
such as G, which ‘go wrong’ might be more salient and vivid than on others such as A and F 
which turn out as successes; this is elaborated in the following paragraphs. 
With regard to Case B (H): The project’s risk is not adequately recognised and may be 
underestimated (overestimated); thus the hurdle rate is set too high (low) and the project is 
rejected due to a negative NPV, but the erroneous rate is not obvious; the decision-maker will 
not be aware of the false setting of the rate, because companies seldom organise follow-up 
monitoring on projects that have been rejected. The decision-maker is thus not in a position to 
use this information when assessing the next project. Furthermore, even if ex post reviews 
were carried out on B and H, they would show that despite the inappropriate hurdle rates the 
appraisal outcomes were, in fact, the right ones. 
Our model contains two scenarios for incorrect accept-reject decisions: First, a false 
positive case can be illustrated by the fire example in Section 2.2, is represented by Case G in 
Figure 2. The project was not rejected but with an appropriate rate it would have been 
rejected. The hurdle rate was set too low, which resulted in insufficient discounting of future 
cash flows. This can result in accepting a project which is later seen to generate a negative 
NPV. The poor decision evidenced by a poor outcome is likely to be a salient event (red 
feedback field in Figure 2) and can generate the previously described retrievability bias and 
an incorrectly raised hurdle rate in future appraisals.  
Secondly, a false negative case is given in Case C of Figure 2. The project risk is 
overestimated, the hurdle rate therefore set too high, and the project is rejected due to a 
negative estimated NPV. With an appropriate (lower) hurdle rate, the appraisal would have 
correctly shown a positive NPV for the proposed project and the project might have turned 
out to be successful ex post. However, the decision-maker will not realise the false decision 
because the project will not be undertaken. The decision-maker is unlikely to get feedback on 
the mistaken risk assessment and having set the hurdle rate too high and so does not learn 
from the experience. This case illustrates the long-term consequences of setting the hurdle 
rate too high; projects are falsely rejected resulting in underinvestment. Moreover, and as 
indicated above, risky projects are systematically preferred to low-risk projects (Titman and 
Martin, 2010) and a short-term bias is induced (Dobbs, 2009).  
Figure 2 summarises the different combinations of ‘too high/too low’ and ‘accept/reject 
project’ and shows the cases in which feedback is provided to the decision-maker on the 
project appraisal that may influence the setting of the hurdle rate. As indicated above, 
perception and cognitive processes, reinforced by the one-sidedness of the post-audit process 
in concentrating only on adopted proposals, will impact the decision-maker’s judgement and 
subjective reasoning when evaluating future projects. As Case G is a much more salient event, 
the false risk assessment and thus inappropriate setting of the hurdle rate (too low) will 
influence the judgement more severely than Cases A (too high, but project succeeded 
nevertheless) and F (too low, but project succeeded nevertheless).  
Furthermore, we can assume that projects which proved to be successful are subjected to 
investigations less frequently and thoroughly than those, which fail. I.e. cash flows and 
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discount rates might not always be evaluated in a detailed and comprehensive way for 
positive NPV projects ex post. If so, then Cases A and F will result in even less feedback to 
the appraisal including the risk assessment than will Case G and the argument is strengthened 
further.  
Our analysis to this point has referred to the determination of absolute profitability of an 
investment project. However, relative profitability, i.e. the comparison of different (mutually 
exclusive) projects will reveal the same systematisation of cases and errors as derived from 
the original example. Due to a suboptimal setting of the hurdle rate (too low or too high), the 
project which appears relatively profitable is not necessarily the objectively more profitable 
one.  
 
2.5 Discussion 
The two extremes of ex post feedback – on the one hand, no (or lax) follow-up in the case of 
non-adopted or successful proposals and, on the other, a thorough follow-up mechanism on 
bad investments – give different levels of information to the decision-maker. A rigorous 
follow-up monitoring of all proposals could uncover the false setting of hurdle rates. 
However, these procedures might still not overcome the disproportionate effect that an 
accepted project’s failure has on the decision-maker’s intuition and the retrievability bias may 
persist. Failure of the project in general, and the failure of a project due to a false appraisal as 
regards the setting of the hurdle rate, as in Case G, remain the most influential events and will 
be more available in memory for the next project decision when events like these are 
retrieved. It will serve as a strong cue to influence cognitive reasoning and thereby the 
judgement. 
Because of humans’ retrievability bias, the event ‘hurdle rate has been set too low’ – 
additionally associated with a negative affect – stays in memory more easily. The event 
‘(possible) failure’ is likely to come to mind more easily and thus a higher hurdle rate appears 
to be more suitable, and is therefore more ‘probable’, than the truly appropriate one. To the 
decision-maker, it seems it might help to avoid a decision mistake and wrong acceptance of a 
project, and will thus influence judgement. In other words if, next time, information on which 
hurdle rate to set is retrieved from memory, the setting of an underestimation of risk (and thus 
a too low rate) leading to an error, will be the cue that is intuitively more promising. Hence, 
the decision-maker will tend to revise the previous hurdle rate upwards but would not 
systematically set a hurdle rate too low; this explanation is in accordance with empirical 
findings relating to the hurdle rate premium.  
Strategies do exist for correcting cognitive biases, i.e. debiasing, include motivational, 
cognitive and technological strategies or decision aids (see for example Larrick, 2004). 
Moreover, awareness of potential biases and the situations where they can occur is the most 
important requirement for correcting biases (see for example Kahneman, 2003; Milkman et 
al., 2009). However, this debiasing process can be long and requires constant review and 
vigilance in the decision process, particularly the more complex the context, and is up to the 
individual decision-maker (Bazerman and Moore, 2013). Thus, even though an individual is 
aware of a cognitive bias, efforts are needed to correct it. A well-structured investment 
appraisal process with a post audit stage can serve as a good starting point for developing 
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decision aids providing awareness. However, the biases inherent in the setting of the hurdle 
rate may not be easily corrected and are therefore still be observable in practice.  
 
3. Conclusion and Outlook 
Our analysis requires empirical testing to validate the relevance of the retrievability bias in the 
setting of the hurdle rate. Experiments could address the effect of past experience of failed 
investment projects, and of the review process, on future risk assessments and thus the hurdle 
rate decisions. A first testable hypothesis may be:  
H1: The more failures of investment projects a decision-maker has experienced, the 
higher the risk premium incorporated into the hurdle rates applied in future project 
appraisals. 
The failure of an investment project could result from either false investment appraisal or 
from one of the anticipated states of nature (independent of the appraisal). The awareness of a 
false appraisal assumes that some kind of review or post audit of the project has been 
performed – either formally or informally/unconsciously. Thus, we could consider the effect 
of a formal versus a subjective informal review of the failed investment appraisal:  
H2a: The more incorrect assessments of investment projects’ risks (disclosed in a 
formal post-audit process) a decision-maker has made, the higher the risk premium 
incorporated into the hurdle rates applied in future project appraisals. 
H2b: The more incorrect assessments of investment projects’ risks a decision-maker 
has perceived, the higher the risk premium incorporated into the hurdle rates applied 
in future project appraisals. 
Further potential avenues to explore in this context, but which we will not lay out as formal 
hypotheses include: There may be a relationship between the level of detail of a company’s 
review process and its impact on hurdle rate premia. More sophisticated review processes will 
disclose more details and thus more mistakes in the appraisal, which in turn could affect the 
decision-maker’s risk and hurdle rate assessment. Secondly, given that the more investment 
appraisals an individual has been involved in, i.e. the higher a decision-maker’s work 
experience in this field, the more failed investment projects s/he may have experienced. Thus 
one might investigate associations between HRPs and demographic variables such as age, 
years of work experience, or personality traits such as confidence of attitudes to risk.  
To conclude, the determination of parameters in investment appraisal, particularly 
estimating a project’s risk and thus setting the hurdle rate, necessarily involves a certain 
degree of subjectivity. From this it follows that heuristics, which to some extent rely on 
intuition, may guide a decision-maker’s judgement, and cognitive biases can systematically 
distort decisions. This paper shows the effect of the retrievability bias on the judgement of 
experienced managerial decision-makers. It provides a reasoned explanation of how managers 
deciding on investment projects may be biased in tending to systematically set hurdle rates 
higher than suggested by theory. While we are not claiming to provide a complete explanation 
of the paradox, we believe that cognitive biases and the noise in feedback on adopted 
investment proposals play a systematic part in explaining why hurdle rates are set above the 
rationally advocated discount rate, and we thus help solve the Hurdle Rate Premium Puzzle. 
The policy implications of this study are that corporate success could be enhanced, firstly, by 
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making executives aware of the premium phenomenon and of its behavioural causes; and, 
secondly, by widening the scope of the post-audit programme to include significant rejected 
investment proposals, and communicating the opportunity cost of ‘false negative’ decisions 
on proposals not adopted.  
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